The Missile Attack Warning System (MSRN) belongs to strategic defense on a par with anti-missile defense, space control and anti-space defense systems. Currently, they are part of the Aerospace Defense Forces as the following structural units - the anti-missile defense division (as part of the Air and Missile Defense Command), the Main Missile Attack Warning Center and the Main Space Situation Intelligence Center (as part of the Space Command).

Russia's early warning system consists of:
- the first (space) echelon - a grouping of spacecraft designed to detect launches of ballistic missiles from anywhere on the planet;
- the second echelon, consisting of a network of ground-based long-range (up to 6000 km) detection radars, including the Moscow missile defense radar.

SPACE ECHELON

The warning system satellites in space orbit continuously monitor the earth's surface, using an infrared matrix with low sensitivity, they record the launch of each ICBM by the emitted torch and immediately transmit information to the early warning command post.

Currently, there are no reliable data on the composition of the Russian early warning satellite constellation in open sources.

As of October 23, 2007, the SPRN orbital constellation consisted of three satellites. There was one US-KMO in geostationary orbit (Kosmos-2379 was launched into orbit on August 24, 2001) and two US-KS in a highly elliptical orbit (Kosmos-2422 was launched into orbit on July 21, 2006, Kosmos-2430 was launched into orbit on October 23, 2007 ).
On June 27, 2008, Kosmos-2440 was launched. On March 30, 2012, another satellite of this series Kosmos-2479 was launched into orbit.

Russian early warning satellites are considered very outdated and do not fully meet modern requirements. Back in 2005, high-ranking military officials did not hesitate to criticize both the satellites of this type and the system as a whole. The then Deputy Commander of the Space Forces for armaments, General Oleg Gromov, speaking at the Federation Council, said: “ We cannot even restore in orbit the minimum required composition of the missile attack warning system devices by launching hopelessly outdated satellites 71X6 and 73D6».

GROUND TRAIN

Now the Russian Federation is armed with a number of early warning systems, which are controlled from the headquarters in Solnechnogorsk. There are also two checkpoints in the Kaluga region, not far from the village of Rogovo and not far from Komsomolsk-on-Amur on the shores of Lake Khummi.

Satellite image of Google Earth: the main command post of the early warning system in the Kaluga region

The 300-ton antennas installed here in radio-transparent domes continuously monitor the constellation of military satellites in highly elliptical and geostationary orbits.

Satellite image of Google Earth: reserve CP SPRN near Komsomolsk

The information received from spacecraft and ground stations is continuously processed at the early warning command post, with its subsequent transfer to the headquarters in Solnechnogorsk.

View of the spare checkpoint of the early warning system from the side of Lake Khummi

Three radar stations were located directly on the territory of Russia: Dnepr-Daugava in the city of Olenegorsk, Dnepr-Dnestr-M in Mishelevka and the Daryal station in Pechora. In Ukraine, the Dneprs remained in Sevastopol and Mukachevo, the operation of which Russia refused due to the too high cost of rent and the technical obsolescence of the radar.

It was also decided to abandon the operation in Azerbaijan. Here, the stumbling block was blackmail attempts by Azerbaijan and a multiple increase in the cost of rent. This decision of the Russian side caused a shock in Azerbaijan. For the budget of this country, the rent was no small help. Working to ensure the operation of the radar station was the only source of income for many local residents.

Satellite image of Google Earth: Gabala radar station in Azerbaijan

The position of the Republic of Belarus is directly opposite, the Volga radar station was provided by the Russian Federation for 25 years of free operation. In addition, the Window node operates in Tajikistan (part of the Nurek complex).

A notable addition to the early warning system at the end of the 90s was the construction and adoption (1989) of the Don-2N radar station in the city of Pushkino near Moscow, which replaced the Danube-type stations.

Radar "Don-2N"

Being a missile defense station, it is also actively used in the missile attack warning system. The station is a truncated regular pyramid, on all four sides of which there are round headlights with a diameter of 16 m for tracking targets and anti-missiles and square (10.4 x 10.4 m) headlights for transmitting guidance commands to the side of the anti-missiles.

When repulsing ballistic missile strikes, the radar is capable of conducting combat work offline, regardless of the external situation, and in peacetime, in a low radiated power mode to detect objects in space.

Satellite image of Google Earth: radar missile defense of Moscow "Don-2N"

The ground component of the Missile Attack Warning System (SPRN) is a radar station that controls outer space. Radar detection type "Daryal" - over-the-horizon radar of the missile attack warning system (SPRN). The development has been carried out since the 1970s, in 1984 the station was put into operation.

Radar "Daryal"

Satellite image of Google Earth: Radar "Daryal"

Daryal-type stations should be replaced by a new generation, which are built in a year and a half (previously it took from 5 to 10 years).

The latest Russian Radar family "Voronezh" capable of detecting ballistic, space and aerodynamic objects. There are options that work in the range of meter and decimeter waves. The basis of the radar is a phased antenna array, a pre-fabricated module for personnel and several containers with electronic equipment, which allows you to quickly and cost-effectively upgrade the station during operation.

HEADLIGHT radar "Voronezh"

The adoption of the Voronezh radar station into service allows not only to significantly expand the capabilities of missile and space defense, but also to concentrate the ground grouping of the missile attack warning system on the territory of the Russian Federation.

Satellite image of Google Earth: Voronezh-M radar, Lekhtusi village, Leningrad Region (object 4524, military unit 73845)

The high degree of factory readiness and the modular principle of constructing the Voronezh radar made it possible to abandon multi-storey buildings and build it within 12-18 months (the previous generation radars entered service in 5-9 years). All equipment of the station in a container version is delivered from manufacturers to the places of subsequent assembly on a pre-concreted site.

During the installation of the Voronezh station, 23-30 units of technological equipment are used (Daryal radar - more than 4000), it consumes 0.7 MW of electricity (Dnepr - 2 MW, Daryal in Azerbaijan - 50 MW), and the amount serving its staff no more than 15 people.

To cover areas potentially dangerous in terms of missile attacks, it is planned to put 12 radars of this type on combat duty. The new radar stations will operate in both the meter and decimeter bands, which will expand the capabilities of the Russian missile attack warning system. The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation intends to completely replace, within the framework of the state armament program by 2020, all Soviet early warning radars for missile launches.

Designed to track objects in space ships of the measuring complex(KIK) project 1914.

KIK "Marshal Krylov"

Initially, it was planned to build 3 ships, but only two were included in the fleet - the Marshal Nedelin KIK and the Marshal Krylov KIK (built according to a modified project 1914.1). The third ship, "Marshal Biryuzov", was dismantled on the slipway. The ships were actively used both for testing ICBMs and for tracking space objects.

KIK "Marshal Nedelin" in 1998 was withdrawn from the fleet and dismantled for metal. KIK "Marshal Krylov" is currently in the fleet and is used for its intended purpose, based in Kamchatka in the village of Vilyuchinsk.

Satellite image of Google Earth: KIK "Marshal Krylov" in Vilyuchinsk

With the advent of military satellites capable of performing many roles, a need arose for systems for their detection and control. Such complex systems were needed to identify foreign satellites, as well as provide accurate orbital parametric data for the use of PKO weapons systems. For this, the Window and Krona systems are used.

Window system is a fully automated optical tracking station. Optical telescopes scan the night sky, while computer systems analyze the results and filter out stars based on analysis and comparison of speeds, luminosities and trajectories. Then the parameters of the orbits of the satellites are calculated, tracked and recorded.

Window can detect and track satellites in Earth orbit at altitudes from 2,000 to 40,000 km. This, together with radar systems, increased the ability to observe outer space. Radars of the "Dniester" type were not able to track satellites in high geostationary orbits.

The development of the Okno system began in the late 1960s. By the end of 1971, prototypes of optical systems intended for use in the Okno complex were tested at an observatory in Armenia. Preliminary design work was completed in 1976. The construction of the “Window” system near the city of Nurek (Tajikistan) in the area of ​​the village of Khodzharki began in 1980.

By mid-1992, the installation of electronic systems and part of the optical sensors was completed. Unfortunately, the civil war in Tajikistan interrupted this work. They resumed in 1994. The system passed operational tests at the end of 1999 and was put on combat duty in July 2002.

The main object of the Window system consists of ten telescopes covered by large folding domes. The telescopes are divided into two stations, with a detection complex containing six telescopes. Each station has its own control center. A smaller eleventh dome is also present. In open sources, his role is not disclosed. It may contain some sort of measuring equipment used to assess atmospheric conditions prior to activation of the system.

Satellite image of Google Earth: elements of the Window complex near the city of Nurek, Tajikistan

The construction of four Okno complexes was envisaged in various places throughout the USSR and in friendly countries such as Cuba. In practice, the Window complex was implemented only in Nurek. There were also plans to build auxiliary Okno-S complexes in Ukraine and eastern Russia. In the end, work began only on the eastern Okno-S, which should be located in Primorsky Krai.

Satellite image of Google Earth: elements of the Okno-S complex in Primorye

"Window-C" is a high-altitude optical surveillance system. The Okno-S complex is designed for monitoring at an altitude of between 30,000 and 40,000 kilometers, which makes it possible to detect and observe geostationary satellites that are located over a wider area. Work on the Okno-S complex began in the early 1980s. It is not known whether this system was completed and brought to combat readiness.

Krona system consists of an early warning radar and an optical tracking system. It is designed to identify and track satellites. The Krona system is able to classify satellites by type. The Krona system consists of three main components:
- decimeter radar with a phased antenna array for target identification;
- centimeter-range radar with a parabolic antenna for target classification;
- an optical system that combines an optical telescope with a laser system.

The Krona system has a range of 3200 km and can detect targets in orbit at an altitude of up to 40,000 km.

The development of the Krona system began in 1974, when it was found that current spatial tracking systems could not accurately determine the type of satellite being tracked.

The radar system of the centimeter range is designed for precise orientation and guidance of the optical-laser system. The laser system was designed to provide illumination for an optical system that captures images of tracked satellites at night or in clear weather.

The location for the Krona facility in Karachay-Cherkessia was chosen taking into account favorable meteorological factors and the low dust content of the atmosphere in this area.

Construction of the Krona facility began in 1979 near the village of Storozhevaya in southwestern Russia. The object was originally planned to be located together with the observatory in the village of Zelenchukskaya, but fears about the creation of mutual interference with such a close placement of objects led to the relocation of the Krona complex to the area of ​​​​the village of Storozhevaya.

The construction of capital structures for the Krona complex in this area was completed in 1984, but factory and state tests were delayed until 1992. Before the collapse of the USSR, it was planned to use as part of the Krona complex armed with 79M6 Kontakt missiles (with a kinetic warhead) to destroy enemy satellites in orbit. After the collapse of the USSR, three MiG-31D fighters went to Kazakhstan.

Satellite image of Google Earth: centimeter-range radar and optical-laser part of the Krona complex

State acceptance tests were completed by January 1994. Due to financial difficulties, the system was put into trial operation only in November 1999. As of 2003, work on the optical-laser system was not fully completed due to financial difficulties, but in 2007 it was announced that the Krona was put on combat duty.

Satellite image of Google Earth: decimeter radar with a phased antenna array of the Krona complex

Initially, during the Soviet era, it was planned to build three Krona complexes. The second Krona complex was to be located next to the Okno complex in Tajikistan. The third complex began to be built near Nakhodka in the Far East. Due to the collapse of the USSR, work on the second and third complexes was suspended. Later, work in the Nakhodka area was resumed, this system was completed in a simplified version.

The system in the Nakhodka area is sometimes called "Krona-N", it is represented only by a decimeter radar with a phased antenna array. Work on the construction of the Krona complex in Tajikistan has not been resumed.

The radar stations of the missile attack warning system, the Okno and Krona complexes allow our country to conduct operational control of outer space, identify and fend off possible threats in time, and give a timely adequate response in case of possible aggression. These systems are used to perform various military and civilian missions, including collecting information about "space debris" and calculating the safe orbits of active spacecraft.

The functioning of the space monitoring systems "Window" and "Krona" plays an important role in the field of national defense and international space exploration.

Main Structure Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Aerospace Forces On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of Russia's rocket and space defense Missile attack warning

The main task of the Missile Attack Warning System is to detect with high reliability a missile attack on the Russian Federation and the CIS states and issue warnings to command posts about the launch of ballistic missiles, missile attack, information about the aggressor state, attacked areas, time before the arrival of ballistic missile warheads and the scale of a missile strike with characteristics sufficient for decision-making by the highest levels of government of the state and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

The main tasks solved by the PRN system:

1. Formation and issuance of warning information about a missile attack on the highest levels of government of the country and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
2. Detection and classification of missile strikes, identification of the aggressor state, assessment of the scale and degree of threat of a strike in the interests of ensuring the effective use of defensive and strike combat systems of the RF Armed Forces.
3. Formation of "Alarm" signals and target designation information for strategic missile defense and for air defense and missile defense systems.
4. Providing information about the missile attack to the EMERCOM of Russia for the timely adoption of civil defense measures.
5. Instrumental reconnaissance of the parameters and combat capabilities of missiles of potential enemies during their test and combat training launches.

The main information tools of the PRN system

The main information means of the missile attack warning system include both space echelon means (specialized artificial Earth satellites) and ground-based means of over-the-horizon location - a network of Voronezh, Voronezh-DM and Daryal high-readiness radar stations, which detect ballistic missiles in flight at ranges up to 6,000 kilometers.

Detection and determination of the trajectories of launching intercontinental ballistic missiles is carried out by the radiation of the propulsion system plume with the help of onboard detection equipment placed on spacecraft in geostationary or highly elliptical orbits.

Information coming from spacecraft and radar stations flows for processing to the Command Post of the PRN System. A unique automated data processing system for early warning systems, information assets of anti-missile defense and space control systems makes it possible to timely, accurately and reliably establish the fact of a missile attack.

History of the Missile Attack Warning System

By the mid-1960s, the military, scientific, and industrial circles gradually formed a conviction that it was necessary to solve the problems of early detection of a missile attack and constant monitoring of the state and changes in the space situation, which materialized in the corresponding technical proposals.

The basic concept of the construction of the early warning system was formed by the Decrees of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR in 1961 - 1962. and included the following principles:

• layered construction of the system;
• complex use of the received data;
• automation of the process of collecting information;
• centralization of the collection and processing of data from detection equipment, which would make it possible to eliminate errors in combat crews in assessing the situation.

When creating radar stations, the method of over-the-horizon radar was used. Such radars were created at the Radio Engineering Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences under the guidance of Academician A.L. Mints. The first station designed to detect ballistic missiles and space objects was the Dniester radar, which was tested in 1962.

The studies carried out and joint initiatives of the general customer, NII-2 of the Ministry of Defense and RTI of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR led to the adoption in 1967 of a decision to create an early detection radar complex (RO complex) for ballistic missile flight from a northern direction as part of two radar units based on the radar " Dnepr", located in the areas of the cities of Murmansk and Riga, the command post of the complex in the Moscow region, designed to automatically analyze and summarize the information coming from the nodes, the intra-complex data transmission system and the means of transmitting generalized information to the command posts of the country's leadership and the Armed Forces.

The RO complex became the prototype of the domestic missile attack warning system. It was created and tested in a relatively short time and already in August 1970 they were put into service, and soon they were put on combat duty.

At the same time, the first combat military unit was born - a separate missile attack warning division, transformed in the process of building up the PRN system into the 3rd separate missile attack warning army with the formation on its basis of military units and formations of missile defense, anti-aircraft defense and SKKP special arms of the RKO, subordinate to the commander-in-chief of the country's air defense forces.

The modern look of the early warning system was formed by the beginning of the 70s. Since 1976, this system was put into operation and put on combat duty, having in its composition a network of Dnestr and Dnepr radars deployed along the perimeter of the territory of the USSR to create a continuous radar field in the main missile-prone directions.

Subsequently, the Danube-3 and Danube-3U radars were connected to the command post of the Missile Attack Warning System, which were primarily information means of the missile defense system.

The possibilities of obtaining information about the missile situation were not limited to the technical ideas embodied in over-the-horizon radar stations. Throughout the 1960s. the development of a high-orbit space system for detecting launching ballistic missiles on the active leg of the flight by radiation from the torches of rocket engines using passive optical equipment continued.

This system, created at the Central Research Institute "Kometa" under the leadership of Academician Anatoly Savin, was put into service as a space segment of the early warning system in 1983.

A number of scientific teams, of which one of the NIIDAR teams quickly stood out as the head and responsible for solving this problem, took the initiative to develop an over-the-horizon short-wave radar using multiple reflection of radiation along the propagation path from the ionosphere and the earth's surface.

In 1965, a decision was made to create a reduced prototype of such a radar and to carry out an appropriate set of experimental work. This work, which received the code "Duga", subsequently became the basis for the development and creation of two on-duty over-the-horizon stations of the PRN system, which made it possible to control the missile and space situation in the southern and western directions. Subsequently, a head radar unit was created for over-the-horizon detection of missile launches in the Chernobyl area. The second such node in the area of ​​Komsomolsk-on-Amur was presented for autonomous testing.

The final result of these works was the testing of an integrated PRN system as part of optical space, over-the-horizon and over-the-horizon radars for detecting ballistic missiles. In 1980, these tests were completed and the PRN system in a new composition and with new higher characteristics was put on combat duty.

In 1979, a program for the development of early warning systems for the 1980s was approved. To expand the over-the-horizon field, it was planned to build four Daryal-U radars (in the Balkhash, Irkutsk, Yeniseisk and Azerbaijan regions), as well as three Daryal-UM radars (in Mukachevo, Riga and Krasnoyarsk) and a Volga radar with phased antenna array price Belarus | In addition, a significant modernization of the existing Dnepr radar was envisaged.

Plans for the development of a space-based system for detecting missile launches provided for the creation of a command post for detecting strikes from the territories of states possessing missile delivery vehicles and the waters of the World Ocean.

The development of early warning systems, as well as the solution of tasks of particular importance by this system, required the centralization of management and a change in the organizational and staff structure. In July 1977, a decision was made to form a separate special-purpose missile attack warning formation. The tasks of the created PRN association were formulated.

In the late 1980s, it became obvious that the era of radar giants was ending. Ground radar stations and that new generation ground stations should become high-potential, economical in operation, require a minimum amount of building structures and special technical equipment.

It should have been possible to quickly deploy radars in places of deployment, quickly relocate, increase their characteristics, select a specific modification in a number of stations of the same type, differing in operating wavelength and other parameters. To create such tools, it was necessary to develop a new concept based on two technologies - high factory readiness (HFA) and open architecture.

These principles were adopted in the development of a new generation of radar stations. Such stations can be used in the interests of any consumer of the radar situation - in the systems of PRN, space control, anti-missile and air defense, as well as national monitoring facilities.

The technology of high factory readiness involves the development and manufacture of individual modules - finished components of the radar - even at the enterprises of the military-industrial complex. The station is assembled from ready-made unified container-type macromodules, while full-fledged deployment of the radar requires only a minimally prepared site.

The open architecture technology made it possible to design and assemble stations of various modifications based on typical structural components - macromodules that can be changed, expanded and reshaped depending on the purpose of a particular complex and its tasks.

This is the main difference between a new generation of radars and radars with a rigid architecture, in which the design was determined at the stage of initial development and could not be changed until the end of operation or a radical modernization, which removed the station from combat duty for a long time.

Modularity, maximum unification and universalization of equipment make it possible to create radar versions with different potentials. Independent radar modules allow relatively quickly, in just one and a half to two months, to assemble and test ready-made stations on the ground, and, if necessary, change their configuration.

During the 1990s - 2000s. work to maintain and increase the characteristics of missile and space defense systems continued. The missile attack warning system was developed on the basis of the Daryal and Volga ground-based radars and the US-KMO space system. In addition, the resource of Dnepr stations and data transmission systems is supported. The modernization of the early warning system command posts and their software and algorithmic support continued.

In addition, as part of the development of early warning systems, the development of the Unified Space System is currently ongoing, which will become the basis of the space echelon of the missile attack warning system. Its implementation will significantly reduce the time of detection of ballistic missile launches.

Already in 2009-2016, a number of the most modern radar stations were put into military operation, fully complying with the principles of open architecture and high factory readiness "Voronezh-M" and "Voronezh-DM" in the Leningrad, Irkutsk, Kaliningrad and Orenburg regions, Krasnodar, Krasnoyarsk and Altai Territories.

At Voronezh stations, the level of energy consumption and the volume of technological equipment have been significantly reduced. The new radars are capable of solving the tasks of detecting, tracking, classifying and processing information not only for ballistic targets and space objects, but also for aerodynamic targets located in the established zone of responsibility of the station.

The main directions for further development of the Missile Attack Warning System:

• Expansion of the composition of early warning information means and increasing the reliability of missile attack warning information.
• Improving the command posts of the system using the latest information technologies to create a network-centric control loop on their basis, expand the range of tasks to be solved, including for new types of targets, reduce the likelihood of false alarms and develop information interaction with intelligence systems, automated control systems for types and types of aircraft RF, as well as means and systems of air defense-missile defense.
• Development of the space echelon of early warning systems to expand controlled areas and increase the likelihood of detecting ballistic missile launches.
• Creation of a closed radar field based on Russian-based high-factory readiness radars of various ranges to ensure effective control of all missile-hazardous directions.
• Increasing the characteristics of early warning radar systems in relation to all existing and promising types of missile and space attack weapons.
• Permanent reconnaissance of the background-target situation - test and combat training launches of strategic and non-strategic ballistic missiles of foreign states.

History of creation

The development and adoption of intercontinental ballistic missiles in the late 1950s led to the need to create means for detecting launches of such missiles in order to exclude the possibility of a surprise attack.

The construction of the first early warning radars was carried out in 1963-1969. These were two Dnestr-M radars located in Olenegorsk (Kola Peninsula) and Skrunda (Latvia). In August, the system was put into service. It was designed to detect ballistic missiles launched from US territory or from the Norwegian and North Seas. The main task of the system at this stage was to provide information about the missile attack to the missile defense system deployed around Moscow.

In 1967-1968, simultaneously with the construction of radar stations in Olenegorsk and Skrunda, the construction of four Dnepr-type radar stations (a modernized version of the Dnestr-M radar station) began. For construction, nodes were chosen in Balkhash-9 (Kazakhstan), Mishelevka (near Irkutsk), Sevastopol. Another one was built at the site in Skrunda, in addition to the Dnestr-M radar already operating there. These stations were supposed to provide a wider sector of the warning system, expanding it to the North Atlantic, the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions.

At the beginning of 1971, on the basis of the command post for early detection in Solnechnogorsk, a command post for a missile attack warning system was created. On February 15, 1971, by order of the Minister of Defense of the USSR, a separate anti-missile surveillance division took up combat duty.

In the early 1970s, new types of threats appeared - ballistic missiles with multiple and actively maneuvering warheads, as well as strategic cruise missiles that use passive (false targets, radar traps) and active (jamming) countermeasures. Their detection was also hampered by the introduction of radar visibility reduction systems (Stealth technology). To meet the new conditions in 1971-72, a project was developed for a new early warning radar of the Daryal type. In 1984, a station of this type was handed over to the state commission and put on combat duty in the city of Pechora, Komi Republic. A similar station was built in 1987 in Gabala, Azerbaijan.

Space echelon early warning system

In accordance with the project of the missile attack warning system, in addition to over-the-horizon and over-the-horizon radars, it was supposed to include a space echelon. It made it possible to significantly expand its capabilities due to the ability to detect ballistic missiles almost immediately after launch.

The lead developer of the space echelon of the warning system was the Central Research Institute "Kometa", and the Design Bureau named after A.I. Lavochkin.

By 1979, a space system for early detection of ICBM launches from four spacecraft (SC) US-K (Oko system) was deployed in highly elliptical orbits. To receive, process information and control the system's spacecraft in Serpukhov-15 (70 km from Moscow), an early warning control center was built. After conducting flight design tests, the first generation US-K system was put into service in. It was intended to monitor the continental missile-prone areas of the United States. To reduce the illumination by the background radiation of the Earth, reflections of sunlight from clouds and glare, the satellites observed not vertically down, but at an angle. To do this, the apogees of the highly elliptical orbit were located over the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. An additional advantage of this configuration was the ability to observe the American ICBM base areas on both daily orbits, while maintaining direct radio communication with the command post near Moscow, or with the Far East. This configuration provided conditions for observation of approximately 6 hours per day for one satellite. To ensure round-the-clock surveillance, it was necessary to have at least four spacecraft in orbit at the same time. In reality, to ensure the reliability and reliability of observations, the constellation had to include nine satellites. This made it possible to have the necessary reserve in case of premature failure of the satellites. In addition, the observation was carried out simultaneously by two or three spacecraft, which reduced the probability of issuing a false signal from the illumination of the recording equipment by direct or reflected sunlight from clouds. This 9 - satellite configuration was first created in 1987 .

To ensure the solution of the tasks of detecting launches of ballistic missiles and bringing commands to the combat control of strategic nuclear forces (Strategic Nuclear Forces), it was supposed to create a Unified Space System (UNS) on the basis of the US-K and US-KMO systems.

At the beginning of 2012, the planned deployment of VZG radar stations of high factory readiness (VZG radar) "Voronezh" is being carried out in order to form a closed radar field for warning of a missile attack at a new technological level with significantly improved characteristics and capabilities. At the moment, new VZG radars have been deployed in Lekhtusi (one meter), Armavir (two decimeter), Svetlogorsk (decimeter). The construction of a dual VZG meter-range radar complex in the Irkutsk region is ahead of schedule - the first segment of the southeast direction has been put on experimental combat duty, the complex with the second antenna sheet for viewing the east direction is planned to be put on OBD in 2013.

Work on the creation of a unified space system (UNS) is entering the finish line.

Russian early warning stations on the territory of Ukraine

Unlike Russian-leased and Russian-operated early warning radars located in Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, Ukrainian radars are not only owned by Ukraine, but also maintained by the Ukrainian military. On the basis of an interstate agreement, information from these radars, which monitor outer space over Central and Southern Europe, as well as the Mediterranean, is sent to the central command post of the early warning system in Solnechnogorsk, subordinate to the Russian space forces. For this, Ukraine annually received $1.2 million.

In February, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry demanded that Russia increase the payment, but Moscow refused, recalling that the 1992 agreement was for 15 years. Then, in September 2005, Ukraine began the process of transferring the radar to the NSAU, meaning the renewal of the agreement in connection with a change in the status of the radar. Russia cannot prevent American specialists from accessing the radar. At the same time, Russia would have to deploy new Voronezh-DM radars on its territory at an accelerated pace, which it did by putting nodes on duty near Armavir in Krasnodar and Svetlogorsk in Kaliningrad.

In March, Ukrainian Defense Minister Anatoly Gritsenko said that Ukraine would not lease two missile attack warning stations in Mukachevo and Sevastopol to the United States.

In June 2006, Director General of the National Space Agency of Ukraine (NSAU) Yuri Alekseev announced that Ukraine and Russia had agreed to increase the service fee in 2006 in the interests of the Russian side of the radar station in Sevastopol and Mukachevo "one and a half times."

Currently, Russia has abandoned the use of stations in Sevastopol and Mukachevo. The leadership of Ukraine has decided to dismantle both stations within the next 3-4 years. The military units serving the stations have already been disbanded.

see also

• Over-the-horizon radar

Notes

Links

• History and current state of the Russian missile attack warning system
• The history of the creation of a missile attack warning system, arms-expo.ru

FROM The state of the satellite component of the missile attack warning system (EWS) does not inspire optimism. However, a few days ago, a message flashed in the news: the early warning system is in order and the country is protected from attack from any direction. But what does the word "protected" mean if Russia does not have a global missile defense system? There is only an outdated missile defense system in Moscow, which will not be able to fend off a massive attack, although with a certain probability it will save the capital from one or two warheads (warheads). However, what mad nation would dare to strike with such forces? The United States today also does not have a reliable missile defense system, although technologically they are capable of shooting down warheads somewhere over Arctic Canada (figuratively speaking, this is more difficult than hitting a bullet with a bullet) .

There is only one defense against a nuclear attack on Russia: the threat of retaliation. A grim strategy of assured, mutual destruction, born in the era of the Great Confrontation. The state of our nuclear forces is described in the article. In the process of “getting up from their knees”, they suffered significantly, but, apparently, they are still capable of destroying the United States. The problem is, will we have time to respond if America decides to launch a disarming strike? During such an attack, it should be noted that millions of people will die from radioactive fallout, even if only nuclear infrastructure facilities are chosen as targets.

The missile, launched from the United States, will reach its target in Russia in 27-30 minutes. The ability to strike back before the silos are disabled and missile submarines are destroyed at piers or sunk by hunter submarines at sea depends critically on how quickly and reliably the fact of a nuclear attack on Russia can be established. It is highly desirable to detect missile launches in order to have the maximum margin of time. And this can only be done with the help of the early warning satellite constellation.

According to data from various sources, against 16 American early warning satellites, Russia today has only 2! The article below talks about three satellites, but one of them, apparently, has already stopped working.http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1827540.html. It remains to rely only on ground-based early warning radars. Consequently, for most of the day, the early warning system does not see the territory of the United States and almost the entire water area of ​​the World Ocean. This means that in the event of a nuclear attack, Russia would have less than 15 minutes to assess the situation and make a decision. This is too little!

Question: How did we get to this point? What did the government do in the "fat 2000s", swimming in petrodollars? Preparing for the Olympics in Sochi? Now the Defense Ministry is cheerfully reporting on plans to restore the early warning satellite constellation. Let's hope they make it.

Dmitry Zotiev

The author of the following article is Fedor Chemerev, published on the websitehttp://gazeta.eot.su/article/kosmicheskiy-eshelon-sprn.

The last spacecraft of the Russian missile attack warning system (SPRN) was launched on March 30, 2012. Shortly before this, the circumstances of its creation were discussed at the forum of the Novosti Kosmonavtiki magazine. The result of the discussion was the words of one of its participants:“Regarding this car, I would ask you not to flatter yourself, and not to mock” . Bitter as it may seem, but these words can be fully applied to the entire space industry and, undoubtedly, to the space echelon of early warning systems. And this is extremely worrisome.

By the mid-2000s, the first signs of another round of space militarization appeared. In February 2004, the US Air Force's U.S. Air Force Transformation Flight Plan-2004". Later, the main provisions of the report were reflected in the development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, known as the "Unified Perspective 2010", which was further developed in the document "Unified Perspective 2020". It is stated that the main principle of the construction of the American armed forces is "all-encompassing domination." The US Army must be ready to conduct large-scale military operations, including in space, with the most decisive goals.

An important place in the plans for the development of technical means related to military space is given to the space echelon of early warning systems of a new generation.

From the early 1970s to the present, the United States has been in service with the IMEWS (Integrated Missile Early Warning Satellite) system with spacecraft (SC) in geostationary orbits (GSO). The task of the system is, together with ground-based radars, to detect launches of Soviet and Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) at the launch site.

Currently, nine IMEWS satellites are located over the Pacific, Atlantic, Indian Oceans and the European zone, the coverage areas of which cover the entire band along the equator. All of them are equipped with infrared radiation receivers, with the help of which missile launches are detected. The last satellite of this constellation was launched in December 2007.

The more modern SBIRS ("Space-Based Infrared System") is designed to replace the IMEWS system. This is an integrated system, which includes four geostationary satellites (GEO), two vehicles in highly elliptical orbits (HEO) and ground points for collecting and processing data and constellation control. As part of this system, it is planned to have up to 24 low-orbit Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) satellites. All SBIRS spacecraft are equipped with infrared radiation receivers.

STSS low-orbit satellites are designed to detect strategic, tactical and operational-tactical missiles and support military formations and individual units. Their task is to escort a rocket detected by high-orbit satellites SBIRS or IMEWS. The objects of detection and further tracking may be warheads and other missile fragments after they have been separated. In the future, STSS satellites will be equipped with laser radars to measure the range and determine the target state vector.

As of March 2013, the combined SBIRS-STSS constellation is represented by seven satellites: GEO-1 (USA-230, 2011), GEO-2 (USA-241, 2013), HEO-1 (USA-184, 2006), HEO- 2 (USA-200, 2008), STSS-ATRR (USA-205, 2009), STSS Demo 1 (USA-208, 2009) and STSS Demo 2 (USA-209, 2009).

What is the situation with the Russian SPRN space group? According to the Internet resource "Strategic Nuclear Weapons of Russia", as of November 2013, our early warning system included two satellites of the 74D6 type in highly elliptical orbits (VEO) - Kosmos-2422 and Kosmos-2446 (US-KS system) and one in geostationary orbit - Cosmos-2479 (type 71X6, US-KMO system). These are the last satellites manufactured at NPO. Lavochkin. Since the beginning of the 1990s, funding for work on the US-KS system has practically ceased, and by 1995, on the US-KMO system as well. The assembly of vehicles to maintain the orbital group was made from parts and assemblies left over from the Soviet era. To date, these backlogs have been exhausted.

Total - sixteen against three! Such is the quantitative ratio of the forces of the United States and Russia in the space segment of early warning systems. What about quality? What can we oppose to "all-encompassing domination"?

It is believed that a new word in the fate of the space echelon of the early warning system of Russia should be said by the project of the Unified Space System (UNS). The lead developer of the system is JSC “Corporation “Kometa”. This enterprise specializes in the creation of command posts, global information and control systems for various purposes, the development, production and operation of hardware and software for ground and aerospace control, monitoring and telecommunications systems.

Kometa has been the lead developer of the US-K, US-KS (Oko), US-KMO (Oko-1) systems since Soviet times. The lead developer of spacecraft for these systems was NPO im. Lavochkin. The All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Television (VNIIT) developed on-board television-type detection equipment, and the State Optical Institute. Vavilov (GOI) - equipment of a heat direction finding type.

In NPO them. Lavochkin always insisted on the concept laid down in the US-K system. It provided for the presence of only four satellites in highly elliptical orbits (HEO), located so that the observation areas of individual devices in the aggregate would cover all missile hazardous regions (ROR). In addition, each satellite must observe from the upper part of the orbit for 6 hours. The movement of the satellites was synchronized in such a way that at any time any point of the ROP was under observation, and the satellites also insured each other. For this purpose, a device was created with a three-axis orientation system and with the ability to control along all three axes. Its delivery into orbit could be carried out by the light Molniya-M rocket, which is three times cheaper than launching it into the GEO using the heavy Proton-K rocket. Brilliant technical solution! Wasn't it the prototype for the HEO satellites of the new American SBIRS system?

However, due to problems with the detection equipment (they were eliminated only in 1984), the US-K had to be abandoned - in favor of the US-KS system with eight satellites on the HEO and one insurer on the GSO. The obvious shortcomings of the US-KS, in fact, a temporary system, caused distrust on the part of a number of Kometa specialists in the very idea of ​​using highly elliptical spacecraft. Moreover, they were not used in the American IMEWS.

Perhaps these disagreements played a role in the fact that the long-time partner of "Kometa" - NPO im. Lavochkin - outside the CEN project. But there is another explanation as well. Comet needed partners with money. And those who, by the time the tender for the development of spacecraft was held, already had sources of funding other than state ones, could have them. At NPO them. Lavochkin was not there. And they were, for example, at the GKNPTs them. Khrunichev - from commercial launches - until the supply of Protons runs out. RSC Energia, a participant in international projects with the Mir and ISS orbital stations, also had good prospects.

But could it be otherwise in the conditions of very modest funding for protracted space programs? Gazprom probably proceeded from the same logic by ordering Energia satellites of the Yamal series. And, thus, financed the development of a new direction for Energia - unmanned spacecraft of a modern type. And this intellectual and technological backlog is no less valuable than Gazprom's finances.

One way or another, today it is Energia that is the lead developer of the EKS spacecraft. The spacecraft, apparently, is being built on the basis of the Yamal universal non-hermetic platform that meets the requirements of modularity, in which the control, power supply, and thermal control systems are concentrated. The platform has been comprehensively worked out - the Yamals have been operating for more than 9 years.

According to experts, writes Gazeta.Ru, the EKS will be able to detect launches not only of ICBMs, ballistic missiles of submarines, but also operational-tactical and tactical missiles, as well as service the military communications system. Energia has the resources necessary to create a spacecraft. But how long will it take?

Unfortunately, media reports that mention CEN are not encouraging yet. Until recently, Energia had problems with the military. In November 2011, Kommersant.ru reported that the subject of proceedings in the Moscow Arbitration Court was the failure to complete work on the EKS. And this is after their transfer from June 2008 to May 2010!

From the publication in Krasnaya Zvezda dated February 3, 2014, it follows that the construction of the assembly and test building for the EKS spacecraft (run by Spetsstroy of Russia) is unlikely to be completed before the end of the year. The report of Interfax.ru (September 3, 2013) that the head of one of the departments of Spetsstroy, Alexander Belov, was charged with embezzling a large amount of money as part of the GLONASS program is alarming. The leadership of Roskosmos is being reshuffled, and there is talk of reorganizing the rocket and space industry.

It is reported that three-quarters of the electronics in Russian spacecraft are imported. Can't there be dangerous "special bookmarks" in it? In addition, at any time, the manufacturer of a microcircuit or processor can stop producing them - and our hardware developers and programmers will find themselves in a very difficult situation.

All this contributes little to productive, rhythmic work. And time goes by. Will the creators of the CEN even have time to start the first flight design tests before the last Lavochka satellites fall down?

The situation is reminiscent of the beginning of 1999. By that time, the orbital constellation had also “melted away”. However, then the other segments of the early warning system did not inspire optimism. Now the situation is better, the hopes of the military leadership are connected with over-the-horizon radar stations - work on their construction and putting on experimental combat duty is going according to plan.

But it is important to understand that the absence of a space-based early warning system, which means the presence of "holes" in the warning system, can devalue the entire Russian nuclear missile shield - our deterrent weapon. In addition, the unreliability of Russia's early warning system is a powerful argument for the information-psychological war against us.

After the incident with the Korean Boeing-747, shot down by a Soviet fighter in September 1983, the USSR was accused of exceeding the required level of defense and almost of cannibalism. “Burned with milk”, in May 1987, the air defense forces allowed the sports plane of 18-year-old Mathias Rust to land on Red Square. And they became the subject of ridicule from the "world community" and some compatriots. As a result, the command staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR has undergone significant changes. And then there was August 1991...

By the beginning of 1995, the orbital constellation of the early warning system of Russia consisted of 11 satellites. And still, a mistake occurred - when on January 25, 1995, the Norwegian-American, as they later said, research four-stage Black Brant XII rocket was launched, the Russian early warning system qualified it as a nuclear missile attack. It came to the "nuclear briefcase". The world has gone through some unpleasant hours.

Three years later, on March 15 and 16, 1998, the Washington Post published two articles by D. Hoffman under the unifying title "Shattered Shield" ("Leaky Shield") - about the degradation of the Russian missile defense system.

A year later, the Rossiyskiye Vesti newspaper launched a discussion about Russian missile defense. During the discussion, T. Postol, an expert from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, said: “There are many Russian military installations that can be hit from Alaska, and these installations will be destroyed, and the Russian military will not even know that there was a missile attack ... The situation is very risky, because it can initiate a decision by Russia to immediately retaliate, which will be based on unreliable information.”

So, step by step, the dominant opinion in Russian expert circles was the lack of confidence that Russia would be able to repulse the aggressor in time and reliably. Isn't that why the discussion about Russian missile defense was started?

Now our relations with the US have not improved at all. In this situation, gaps in the space echelon of the early warning system may become another reason for putting pressure on the Russian elites (they say that the statements of the Russian authorities about the power of the nuclear missile shield are a bluff, Russia will not be able to prevent a missile attack). And if the opinion that our shield is rusted and good for nothing really prevails in the elite and society, then the situation may worsen catastrophically.

There is another year, maybe two. I would like to believe that the creators of the early warning system will have time. In these minutes, only three "Lavochkin" satellites protect the borders of the Fatherland. We wish them success in their difficult service. And to all the creators of early warning systems, especially those in whose hands the fate of spacecraft is in their hands - responsibility to the country and people they are called upon to protect.

Fedor Chemerev

January 23, 1995, the city of Solnechnogorsk, the command post of the early warning system. The "ROCKET ATTACK" sign lit up on the system's monitoring console. The system recorded the launch of a Trident-class missile. An analysis of the trajectory showed that the missile, when activated at a height, can disable early warning early warning systems or can be aimed at the northern cities of the country. Ground based early warning systems confirmed the launch. All strategic forces were brought to full combat readiness. The bombers roll out onto the runway, the missiles are pointed and ready to launch. A nuclear briefcase is open on the table in front of the President of the country.

The Supreme Commander immediately contacted the Defense Minister. But the Minister of Defense, as a good military specialist, immediately determined that this could not be the beginning of the 3rd World War. If they decided to attack Us, they would start not with one rocket, but immediately with a hundred. Nothing can be done with one rocket.
Later it turned out that the system reacted to the launch of the Norwegian meteorological satellite, information about which was lost in the offices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This was the first case of using the Kazbek system, known as the nuclear suitcase.
The early warning system has been in use for about 30 years and has not had any failures. Many note that in 1985 the system also gave a signal of an attack, but then it itself admitted that the targets were false, so this cannot be considered a failure. The system is very complex and is still on combat duty.

History of creation

space component.

Oko system

Oko-1 system

CEN system

Current state of affairs

Ground component

Radar type "Volga"

Don-2n

Radar type "Voronezh"

Over-the-horizon early warning radar station of high factory readiness. Developed by the Research Institute of Long-Range Radio Communications. There is a station designed for the meter wavelength - "Voronezh-M", and for the decimeter - "Voronezh-DM". A feature of the facility is a significantly shorter deployment time at a new location and the possibility of relocating the station if necessary.
In 2006 it was deployed in the Leningrad region, in 2009 it took up combat duty.
In 2009 deployed in the Krasnodar Territory.
In the future, complexes should be deployed to replace the radar located outside the territory of Russia.

Perimeter system

Only scattered facts are known about this system. Many believe that the existence of such a system is impossible, while others, on the contrary, argue that the system is still functioning and is on alert.

Under the START-1 treaty, Russia was supposed to remove the system from combat duty. Although the contract has already expired, the state of the system is not known for certain. According to some reports, she was again put on combat duty in 2001.